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Abstract 
Few sources have survived relating to the borough of Sunderland in the seventeenth 
century. However, during the Civil Wars Sunderland was noticed for its support of 
Parliament and the Scottish Covenanters. A Puritan elite, led by George Lilburne, had 
established Sunderland as a radical borough by the 1630s. Good relations between 
Sunderland and the Covenanting Scots began in 1639 and continued throughout the 
Bishops’ Wars (1639-41) and the first British Civil Wars (1642-46). This was unusual 
in the North East of England as most of County Durham, Northumberland and 
Newcastle upon Tyne would remain loyal to King Charles I. A trade blockade of 
Newcastle, Sunderland and Blyth during 1643-4 was quickly lifted at Sunderland 
after the Scots garrisoned the town in March 1644. This gave Sunderland a 
temporary, but advantageous, lead over their rivals in Newcastle. Sunderland’s port 
was crucial for supplying the Scottish Covenanting army and Parliamentarian forces 
during 1644-46 and the coal mines along the River Wear proved a vital source of 
revenue for paying the army. The borough’s leaders were well rewarded for their 
loyalty and, unlike other leading supporters of Parliament in the North, they did not 
object to paying for the Scottish occupation of the North East. 
Keywords: Sunderland; Scottish Covenanters; Civil Wars; Coal trade; George 
Lilburne; Newcastle upon Tyne 
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The Scottish Covenanters and the Borough of Sunderland, 1639-1647: a Hidden 
Axis of the British Civil Wars* 
For a few years in the mid seventeenth century Sunderland, a relatively small coastal 
borough, became prominent in national affairs. Sunderland was arguably pivotal to 
the support and supply of the Scottish Covenanting army and Parliamentary forces 
during the mid 1640s. This had implications for the success of these armies against 
Royalist forces in the North of England. Without access to the wealth of the coal 
mines along the River Wear, and the port of Sunderland, the Covenanters might 
have had to turn back and the war could have taken a different course.  
Sunderland’s place in the wars was first highlighted many decades ago by 
Charles S. Terry in The Life and Campaigns of Alexander Leslie, First Earl of Leven (1899) 
and in his edited Papers relating to the Army of the Solemn League and Covenant 1643-
1647 (1917). Henry W. Meikle’s Correspondence of the Scots Commissioners in 
London, 1644-1646 (1917) also noted the borough’s significance.1 Sunderland then 
faded from histories of the wars and later-twentieth-century studies tended to focus 
on the military impact upon the much larger city of Newcastle upon Tyne, rather than 
other boroughs in the North East of England. Examples include Ian Gentles’, The New 
Model Army in England, Ireland and Scotland, 1645-1653 (1994) and Roger Howell’s, 
Newcastle upon Tyne and the Puritan Revolution, A Study of the Civil War in North 
England (1967). Lawrence Kaplan’s, Politics and Religion during the English Revolution, 
The Scots and the Long Parliament 1643-1645 (1976) makes little reference 
Sunderland either.2 Edward Furgol’s Regimental History of the Covenanting Armies 
1639-1651 (1990) and Mark Fissel’s, The Bishops’ Wars, Charles I's campaigns against 
Scotland 1638-1640 (1994) did briefly note campaigns near Sunderland, but did not 
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probe the importance of this port for supplying the armies. The overall paucity of 
references to Sunderland in later-twentieth-century historiography has been 
somewhat remedied in the early twenty-first century by the work of Matthew 
Greenhall, P. Whillis and Maureen Meikle and Christine Newman.3 
 
So 'twas when Rebels had pull'd down 
The Mitre, Scepter, and the Crown, 
 By way of a Moderation; 
Thieves of Commissioners of Safety 
Of all things you were worth, bereft ye, 
 And most demurely talk'd of Sequestration. 
They took your Money civily, 
And parting cry'd, the Lord be we ye; 
 Without approbrious Names, 
Well knowing, that a Curse or two 
Would nothing for their Purpose do 
 But spoil their After-Games; 
Because it was enough to kill, 
To covet, backbite, whore and steal…4 
 
 
Sunderland’s republican stance during the British Civil Wars was still 
remembered in this satirical poem of 1710. That Sunderland would take a radically 
different path from the mostly conservative North East of England during this 
turbulent time in history was evident from the 1630s onwards. Sunderland’s Puritan 
oligarchy had rejected the Bishop of Durham’s attempts to control their borough in 
the 1630s and stood defiantly against the introduction of Arminianism and levying of 
ship money. They did indeed pull ‘down the mitre, sceptre and crown’ during the 
1640s and were able to do so with military support from Scotland and Parliament, as 
well as backing from Parliament and financiers in the City of London. 
The Bishops’ Wars 
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Sunderland had first been noted for its strategic importance during the Bishops’ 
Wars that began when the Scottish Covenanting army raising its banner at Duns Law 
in Berwickshire on 5 June 1639. There was no invasion of England at this time as a 
truce was negotiated with King Charles, whose forces were encamped near Berwick 
upon Tweed. The Covenanters were led by Alexander Leslie (later Earl of Leven). 
They were feared as their ranks included many battle-hardened Scots who had 
fought for Sweden in the Thirty Years’ War.5 Being a Puritan-led borough Sunderland 
was sympathetic to the aims of the Covenanters, who wanted to protect their 
Presbyterian faith against the Episcopalian designs of Charles I. There had been 
contact between these parties via George Stevenson. He was a servant of the 
powerful and prosperous Sunderland merchant, George Lilburne, who was also an 
uncle of the Leveller leader John Lilburne. 
Thomas Triplet the self-righteous rector of Whitburn near Sunderland who 
was an instrument of the Archbishop of Canterbury, William Laud, called Lilburne 
and George Grey, another prosperous Sunderland trader, ‘the two most arrant 
covenanters and dangerous boutefeus [incendiaries] that are in these parts’ in 
February 1640.6 Triplet knew that Lilburne was being tried before the Ecclesiastical 
High Commission at Durham for his stance against Arminianism at his local parish 
church, St Michael and All Angels, Bishopwearmouth near Sunderland. His 
opposition to ship money and ‘defence of the Covenanters in Scotland’ also made 
Lilburne a marked man. Grey had been arrested for orchestrating a tenants’ petition 
against increased entry fines, presented to the Dean and Chapter of Durham in 
1639.7 Grey and Lilburne were released and proceeded to attack Triplet through 
their London contact Giles Baggs, a wealthy coal merchant. He reported ‘that 
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Thomas Triplet had done a very ill office in the North, having brought two very 
honest men into great trouble and charges, so that they have endured long 
imprisonment and spent at least £50 apiece’. Lilburne and Grey appeared before the 
Privy Council  
where the King himself was present … they are come off with a great deal of 
credit, insomuch that the King himself gave them thanks for the pains they 
had taken in the cause, and now they are suitors to the King and Council that 
they may have remedy against Thomas Triplet, with whom the Bishop of 
Durham and all the gentlemen of the country are much offended8 
 
To his credit the Bishop of Durham, Thomas Morton, refused to be involved in 
Triplet’s vendetta against Lilburne and Grey.9 Morton was not overly concerned with 
punishing Puritans within his diocese and as Prince Bishop he had granted 
Sunderland a charter of incorporation in 1634 in recognition of the borough’s 
growing economic prosperity.10 
Economic links between Sunderland and the City of London were strong as 
the capital imported the majority of coal produced by mines along the River Wear. 
London merchants also extended capital to Sunderland’s mercantile elite to secure 
the leases of these mines. Sunderland’s leaders shared their Puritan ideology with 
many London merchants, a fact not unnoticed by Triplet in his continued vendetta 
against Lilburne. Undaunted by the Privy Council’s leniency Triplet insisted that 
Sunderland’s leaders would ‘learn southern disobedience’ in June 1640, and he 
determined to uncover Lilburne  as a Covenanter.11 By July it was rumoured that the 
Scots ‘plot is to be master over the Tyne and Sunderland, and by stopping the coal 
trade to compel the King and Kingdom of England to grant them more than ever yet 
they desired’.12 This link between the Scottish Covenanters and the coal wealth of 
the Tyne and Wear was real enough and would surface in the Second Bishops’ War 
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that began in August 1640. This time the Scots did cross the Border into North East 
England.  
The alleged Scottish Covenanter threat to set light to the collieries along the 
Tyne and Wear proved to be unfounded as these mines were far more useful to 
them in working order.13  Thomas Wentworth, Earl of Strafford, was concerned 
about the royal army's slowness to respond to this invasion and ordered Mountjoy 
Blount, Earl of Newport, to ‘issue arms from Hull and speed up deliveries to 
Sunderland, so that the full number of regiments could get to the front and 
Newcastle be safeguarded’.14 This attempt was futile for, after the battle of Newburn 
on 28 August, Newcastle was occupied. Bishop Morton reported on 30 August that  
there is a ship laden with the King's ordnance about to come into the harbour 
of Sunderland, and I am in great doubt that there are Covenanters' spies in 
that town who will give immediate intelligence to the rebels if they come 
within the bar, that they may be surprised.15  
 
Morton’s fears about Covenanter activity in Sunderland were realised with an 
audacious raid on 7 September 1640. ‘They came with four troops of horse, Lord 
Yester commanding them, at 12 o'clock at night and took away £70 of the King's 
money.’ The Scots actually took £840 which would have been a major blow to the 
local customs collector, though the pro-Scots merchants of Sunderland would not 
have been sorry to see a much hated tax purloined. The Covenanters then took 
control of the borough without opposition.16  
General Alexander Leslie apprehended ‘the Receiver of his Majesty's 
Customs’ at Sunderland on 11 September 1640 to intercept further custom’s 
revenues.17 On 23 September a ‘proclamation by the Scots army at Sunderland’ 
ordered that from 29 September those who were of the Protestant religion in 
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County Durham were to make themselves known to the army, so that they would be 
‘tenderly dealt with’ and not have their hay and corn disturbed. If they did not do 
this they could be labelled enemies of Protestantism and have their crops seized for 
the army’s use.18  The Covenanting army were demanding £25,000 from Durham, 
Northumberland and Newcastle to pay for their occupation and they remained in the 
area until 1641 with Viscount Maitland’s Foot being stationed in Sunderland during 
January 1641.19 The Scots’ interest in the coal trade and its revenues was reinforced 
when ‘General Leslie and Sandy (Colonel Alexander) Hamilton, their Lord General of 
the Ordnance … visited the ports of Tynemouth, Sunderland, and Hartlepool’ in 
February 1641.20 The Scottish army returned north after a peace treaty was signed at 
Ripon in October 1641, but their knowledge of North East England, and Sunderland 
in particular, would serve them well in the ensuing British Civil Wars of 1642-46.21 
Sunderland versus the bishop of Durham 
In early 1642 a heady mix of religion and politics was unsettling Sunderland’s civic 
leadership. There was considerable opposition to John Johnson, rector of 
Bishopwearmouth and chaplain to Bishop Morton, who had not preached to his 
parishioners whilst the Scots army resided near Sunderland.  In defiance of the 
Bishop, the people of Sunderland wanted to employ one of the preachers they had 
heard during the Scottish occupation, Timothy Batt.22 As Mayor of Sunderland 
George Lilburne used Sunderland’s protestation return to the House of Commons on 
23 February to gain support for Batt against the might of the Bishop. These returns 
were required by Parliament to prove loyalty to the government and the Protestant 
religion: 262 Sunderland men assented to this petition with only 17 absent as they 
were at sea.23 On 26 February Lilburne triumphed as the House of Commons ordered 
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that ‘Mr. Timothy Batt, an orthodox Divine, be appointed Lecturer, to preach every 
Sunday in the Afternoon, and every Wednesday in the Week, in Bishop Wearmouth 
Church, being the Parish Church, the Port of Sunderland …’ Lilburne’s victory was 
short lived though as his continued support for Puritanism would land him in more 
trouble with Church authority and by March 1643 Timothy Batt had moved to 
Illminster.24 
Civil War begins 
By late August 1642, with the threat of war looming, Parliamentary ammunition was 
reported to have arrived in Sunderland aboard a ‘Flemish Pink’.25 Parliament feared 
that it would fall into Royalist hands, but nothing more is known of this cargo. 
Sunderland’s civic leaders would have demonstrated their opposition to the King and 
his Royalist forces when war did finally break out on 23 October 1642. George 
Lilburne’s hostility was noted for ‘before the late wars, (he) was deeply engaged 
against the tyrannical power of the late King in point of ship-money’. Lilburne naturally 
supported the cause of Parliament by promoting  
its interest in the Northern Counties, being justice of the peace, and held 
meetings and tried to raise forces to oppose those being raised in 1642 for the 
King. In October [he] opposed the Commission of Array at hazard of his life at 
the Sessions House, Durham [and] had to fly for his life. 26  
 
The Royalist William Cavendish, Earl of Newcastle, sought Lilburne’s arrest ‘as puritan, 
rogue and roundhead’ and ‘the greatest enemy in those parts.’ Lilburne however 
‘stole away … and went to Edinburgh to ask help of Pickering, Parliament's agent there’ 
proving that his links with the Scots were still strong and very convenient.27 He 
returned home on his wife's assurance that Sir William Lambton would protect him, 
but on 11 November he ‘was seized, brought to Durham, robbed of all he had, and 
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taken to York, where he was kept 14 months, resisting the offers of Ralph Lambton to 
have him liberated, if he would contribute to the earl of Newcastle's forces’. Lambton 
noted that Lilburne ‘would rot in prison rather than assist against Parliament’.28 The 
sixty-year-old Lilburne had been ‘marched through mire and dirt to York’ and thus 
missed the early events of the Civil Wars in the North East, but his fellow Puritans in 
Sunderland continued to support the cause of Parliament.29 
 Like many other English boroughs Sunderland would have been fortified 
during 1642-3, though details about this are scarce. The borough had a harbour and 
a naturally defensive riverbank, but had no town walls as it had never been a large 
settlement in medieval times. Some defences would also have appeared along the 
North Sea coast, but there was no real fortification at this time. These preparations 
were slight in comparison to the defences built up around towns like Gloucester, 
Reading and Shrewsbury.30  
Blockading the coal trade 
Parliament began to debate coal shipments from the Tyne and Wear in January 
1643. It was concerned about opposition from the pro-Royalist garrison at 
Newcastle. The Earl of Newcastle was threatening to impose a tax on every ship 
loading coals to support the Royalist cause. The House of Lords feared that coal pits 
would ‘be quite lost, and become irrecoverable’ and that London would be unable to 
get necessary supplies of coal from elsewhere.31 An order was made on 14 January 
1643 for ‘stopping the Coal Trade to Newcastle’. It noted ‘the number of ships and 
quantity of money that is every year employed, from London and other parts and 
places of this kingdom, for the fetching of coals and salt’ from the Tyne and Wear. 32 
Unfortunately for Sunderland the ban included their borough and Blyth in 
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Northumberland. This meant that no coal could legally be shipped from these ports 
to London and neither were supply ships allowed to enter them until Royalist 
Newcastle fell into Parliament’s hands. Any vessel trying to go to these ports after 1 
February 1643 would ‘be seized upon and stayed in such port and place where they 
come in’.33 It looked as though Sunderland was being punished, despite its loyalty to 
Parliament. However, Parliament had not anticipated that this blockade would last 
long for Newcastle had been in economic decline during the later 1630s and early 
1640s.34 
The effect of the blockade upon Sunderland’s domestic and foreign trade was 
immediate. As coal supplies were prevented from reaching London, coal became 
scarce there and prices rose alarmingly. Instead of being loaded into keel boats coals 
were heaped up along the banks of the Wear. Some ships managed to evade the 
sanctions in the summer of 1643, arguing that bad weather on a voyage to Scotland 
made them take shelter at Sunderland. Ships could make huge profits on coal 
cargoes for the price reached a record 23 shillings per chaldron in the coal starved 
south of England. Parliament tried to argue, ineffectively, that any coal from 
Sunderland should be sold for the benefit of the poor. Even coal-fired beacons that 
warned shipping of rocks began to run short of fuel in June 1643, but the blockade 
continued as Newcastle was still defiant.35  
The Covenanting Army returns 
The garrison at Newcastle ignored the Solemn League and Covenant agreed between 
the Parliaments of England and Scotland in August and September 1643. This League 
would have consequences for the Royalists in the North as it agreed to a Scottish 
army coming into England to fight for ‘the preservation and reformation of religion, 
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the true honour and happiness of the King, and the public peace and liberty of his 
dominions’.36 Sir William Armine, a prominent Parliamentarian, urged the Scottish 
Covenanting army to invade northern England and attack Newcastle and other 
Royalist strongholds. Armine would become the resident Parliamentarian 
commissioner at Sunderland in March 1644.37 
The Scottish Covenanting army, led by the Earl of Leven, duly crossed the 
Border into England on 18 January 1644 and the newly-created Marquis of 
Newcastle hurried north to oppose them. There were skirmishes near Corbridge in 
Northumberland and Prudhoe in County Durham during February 1644. They then 
headed east and crossed the River Wear at the Chester New Bridge on 2 March 
1644.38 A contradictory Royalist account wrongly stated that they crossed the Tyne 
and were ‘forced’ into Sunderland by their army.39 Chester New Bridge was the only 
bridge across the Wear between Durham and the North Sea and it would have given 
the Scots ‘a very inconvenient passage had it been disputed’.40 Although Newcastle 
was their ultimate aim, the Scots always intended to head for Sunderland. On 19 
February 1644 the Scottish Parliamentary Commissioners wrote to the Committee of 
the Army noting  
There is £4,000 worth of butter and cheese already embarked in the Thames 
to be sent unto you with the first occasion to the port of Sunderland, if there 
shall not be safe entry into Newcastle, whereof so soon as it shall please God 
to make you masters, we entreat your Lordships to send £2,000 worth of coal 
for the poor of the City, which will be very acceptable to all here, and will 
much conduce to public ends.41 
 
 On March 2 according to Mr Robert Douglas, a minister who travelled with 
the Scottish forces, the Covenanting army quartered at ‘Mid-Harraton’ on the north 
bank of the Wear for two nights.42 They were desperate for supplies and headed 
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towards Sunderland upon ‘receiving intelligence that we should have that Haven 
secured …’ After ‘resting the Lords day, the Enemy crossed the River … so we 
entered [Sunderland] on Monday [4 March] without striking one blow.'43 
They had ‘crossed the river Wear in two divisions, one at Hylton and the 
other at the ford of Ford Hall’. They then united and marched ‘by the Willow Pond, 
down Silksworth Row, past Bishopwearmouth Church, to take up its position in 
Sunderland High Street’.44 After their welcome from the borough’s councillors the 
soldiers camped 'on the open [unenclosed] ground between Bishopwearmouth and 
Sunderland’.45 By 12 March Sunderland had been properly fortified ‘and a garrison 
settled therein’ on the Pann Field. It was a good defensive site, for the Scots had 
enclosed their camp on the three landward sides. The river side did not need 
defences as it overlooked a steep and craggy bank with the Pann Sand shoal below 
blocking any attacks from the Wear. The opposite ground of Monkwearmouth shore 
was low and flat, making the camp unassailable by enemy artillery from there.46 
Military occupation 
Sunderland was therefore ‘a place which proved full of advantages to the Army’. The 
Scots had ‘fortified Sunderland as well as the place was capable’47 and appointed 
Quartermaster General Ludovick Leslie as their military governor.48 The Scots took 
over the ammunition left by fleeing Royalists. Another Scottish garrison was 
established on the opposite side of the Wear at Monkwearmouth from the 5 March 
until September 1644. Both garrisons were therefore dug in and well supplied with 
arms for any impending attacks. The Sunderland and Monkwearmouth garrisons 
were fairly small as the Scots army only amounted to ‘18,000 foot and 3,500 horse’ 
in total. They also had to be highly mobile to cope with the demands of war as 
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skirmishes could occur anywhere, at any time.49  The church towers at 
Bishopwearmouth and Monkwearmouth were used as watch towers to spot and 
rebuff Royalist raiding parties. 
Even though the garrisons were small they were well supplied with 
munitions. The surviving army accounts list all the gunpowder, matches, musket 
balls, cannonballs, mattocks and spades provided to them.50 The Scots army also 
brought many weapons with them and had received 3000 arms and 300 barrels of 
powder from Parliament through Hartlepool in late February.51 Further supplies 
came from Scotland as 30,000 matches, 10,000 musket balls and 10 cwt of powder 
were ordered to be sent from the Edinburgh public magazine to Sunderland on 18 
March 1644.52 Armed keel boats were evidently at the Scots’ disposal as well for on 
12 June Edward Philpotts claimed thirty 3lb cannonballs and eighteen ‘fadons of 3 
inch tard towes [linen fuses] for the close keel.’ Cannons were later situated along 
the riverbanks for on 7 September Henry Gislingham took ‘50 powder, 75 
musketballs and 9 3lb cannonballs for the river.’53 
[Insert Map here]  
[Caption for map - Military manoeuvres in and around Sunderland, 1644] 
Counter attack 
The Scots initial delight at taking Sunderland on 4 March was short lived. A Royalist 
counter-attack began at one o’clock on 6 March with a skirmish near Chester New 
Bridge. Accounts of this encounter naturally differ according to which side they 
emanated from, but Royalist troops definitely crossed the bridge and advanced 
eastwards only to be met by Scots cavalrymen near Lambton. According to the 
Royalists  
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after some bullets had been exchanged and they appeared again in greater 
force, we backed our party with Lord Henry [Percy's] regiment ... with whom 
we also sent some musketeers; which caused the enemy that day to look 
upon us from a farther distance. We judged they were about 500 horse when 
they appeared most, yet they continued most of that day in our sight.54  
 
On 7 March they advanced to Penshaw Hill only to be met by Scottish forces upon 
Humbledon Hill. The Royalists reported that the Scots were ‘backward to join’ in a 
fight, but knowing of Sunderland’s strategic importance they resolved to ‘march 
towards the town, either to possess ourselves of it or a piece of ground near unto 
it’.55 Some of the Scots hastily left Humbledon Hill to fight the advancing Royalists.  
 The skirmish began near Offerton through ‘some fields of furze and whin 
bushes … three thick hedges with banks, two of which they had lined with 
musketeers’. The Scots had another ‘200 musketeers and a drake [small cannon] 
which flankered those hedges which were betwixt us, and from thence there ran a 
brook, with a great bank down to the River Weir’. Realising they were outflanked the 
Royalists retreated to Penshaw Hill ‘where being saluted with cold blasts and snow, 
our horses sufferance with hunger that we seemed so far to become friends as in 
providing against these common enemies’.56  
Both sides faced each other again the following morning, but heavy snow 
showers and hungry horses made the Royalists retreat with the same sneering 
allegation that the enemy was ‘hard to be provoked’. They refused to admit any 
defeat and ‘sent 120 Horse to entertain them’ as a diversion whilst they retreated 
westwards. 200 Scottish musketeers and some dragoons then apparently battled 
this cavalry unit who ‘killed some forty of them and had taken near 100 men but 
they advanced so suddenly, that we could bring … but twenty of them’ away.57 
Another account gives Sir Charles Lucas’s Royalist cavalry a total of seventy-four 
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killed and sixty-nine prisoners taken, but the Royalists themselves only admitted to 
one fatality and five injured men during this encounter. Some of the Scots were 
accused of running away, but in reality 600 Scots had counter-attacked the 
retreating Royalist baggage train, forcing another cavalry and musketeer fight.58 The 
Royalists ruefully recorded the ‘we brought our horse home very weary, which did us 
more harm than the enemy could’.59 
Sir Charles Lucas had brought ‘21 Troops from Yorkshire’ and ‘1500 Foot, 
from Cumberland’,60 but even with these extra men he had failed to oust the Scots 
army from Sunderland. The Scots accused their enemy of sneaking away to Durham 
under cover of the snow storm. They returned to their quarters in Sunderland 
scornfully reporting that ‘the enemies lying in the field two nights, was almost as bad 
as a battle to them, many of their men and horse dying, but more running away’.61 
Nevertheless, they exaggerated when reporting that the Royalists had lost 800 
horses to the cold weather.62 The precise geography of this encounter was recorded 
by Robert Douglas in his Diary, as he correctly identified Penshaw and Humbledon 
Hills as the armies’ vantage points. Douglas noted Royalist casualties as ‘20 of them 
killed, 32 taken, 28 die by the way, some of their horses, many ran away’. He also 
observed that seven of the Scottish regiments wisely went ‘to the other side Wear’ 
on 9 March in case there was another attack from the north.63 
Although this encounter had been indecisive, it was the first time that the 
Covenanting army had made full use of its impressive artillery near Sunderland. They 
had in all ‘eight brass 24 lbrs., one brass 18 lbr., three brass 12 lbrs., six iron 9 lbrs., 
forty-two iron 3 lbrs., eighty-eight case of frames [which fired several musket balls at 
once], and six petards.’64 The Scottish army had thereafter split and marched 
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towards Durham, Hartlepool and South Shields on 12 March, but left ‘two regiments 
at Sunderland for the security of that place.’65 They also used Sunderland as a 
holding area for prisoners taken during this skirmish and from subsequent 
encounters in the Civil Wars, as well as Catholic prisoners from the North of 
England.66 
Lifting the Blockade 
After word reached London that the Scots were in control of Sunderland the House 
of Commons immediately discussed lifting their trade blockade. On 12 March they 
noted that ‘by the good providence and blessing of almighty God, and the 
endeavours of our brethren in Scotland, the towns and ports of Sunderland and Blyth 
are lately rescued out of the hands of the enemy.’ They already knew about the 
‘extremity of want’ and ordered 
‘that it shall and may be lawful for any person or persons, under the 
obedience of the king and Parliament, from henceforth, to trade and go with 
their ships and vessels unto either of the said ports of Sunderland or Blyth; 
and to carry with them arms, ammunition, corn, or any other provision of 
victuals, for the relief of the said inhabitants, of the armies of our said 
brethren of Scotland, or such other forces as are or shall be employed in the 
service of the king and Parliament … and to make returns of coals, salt, or 
other merchandize, from the said several Ports.’67  
 
On 19 March 1644 the Commons again ordered pro-Parliamentary shipping to trade 
with Sunderland and Blyth in coals that were badly needed in the south. On 21 
March the House of Lords also consented to freeing up shipping to Sunderland.68  
The collier fleet from Sunderland took full advantage of the resumption of 
trade to London, though they were accused of stalling ‘betwixt this [London] and 
Harwich, and send in their coals by small parcels, thereby to raise the price’.69 The 
renewed coal trade gave an irreversible economic opportunity to the coal merchants 
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of Wearside. They took full advantage of the ongoing blockade of the River Tyne to 
supply London where riots were feared through the lack of coal.70  
The Battle of Hylton 24-25 March, 1644 
The two regiments at Sunderland had remained vigilant in their defence of the Wear 
whilst their comrades attacked the Royalist fort at South Shields. After this fort was 
captured there was no respite for a battle would take place to the west of 
Sunderland, near Hylton, on 24-25 March 1644. Some accounts place this battle site 
two miles north of Sunderland, but the fighting would actually take place between 
Boldon Hills, Hylton and Southwick on the north side of the Wear (see map). Scottish 
forces came from Monkwearmouth, Boldon and South Shields to counter attack 
Royalist forces. It was fortuitous that they had been reinforced by Sir James 
Lumsden’s 3,000 troops from Northumberland on 23 March.71 Both sides had 
apparently taunted each other with the words 'The Lord of Hosts is with us' from the 
Scots in response to Newcastle’s 'Now or Never'.72 This encounter really should be 
known as the battle of Hylton as the fighting took place near Hylton Castle, three 
miles north-west of Sunderland. 
 As with the skirmish at Offerton, there are conflicting accounts about this 
battle in surviving pamphlets and letters. The Marquis of Newcastle’s forces craftily 
attempted to surprise the Scots camped on the north side of the Wear during 
sermon time on Sunday 24 March, but were spotted. According to Scottish reports 
Leven’s Scottish army quickly drew together at ‘Sudichhill’ [Southwick Hill], with 
reinforcements at Boldon. Robert Douglas, who was embedded with the Scots at 
Boldon Hills, recalled that ‘about 4 a clock, they began to play on both sides from 
hedges; we beat them from two hedges. The service is hot till 12 a clock at night … 
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Many of theirs wounded sent away; they retire to the hill, we stand our ground.’ The 
next day the Scots did ‘plant their hedges’ whilst the Royalists concealed their 
retreat towards Durham by ‘casting up breast work for cannon’.73 
 Another Scottish report noted that as it was a foggy day the enemy had 
hoped to surprise the Godly Scots during their Sunday service. However, hedges and 
ditches prevented the two armies meeting in open combat, prompting the continual 
cannon fire until midnight noted by Douglas. ‘Many officers, who have been old 
soldiers, did affirm they had never seen so long and hot service in the night time … 
divers killed on both sides.’ The Scots claimed to have killed more Royalists than 
their side lost because of ‘the dead bodies we found the next day upon the ground, 
beside the seven wagons draught of dead and hurt men not able to walk that the 
constable of Boldon affirmed he saw carried away.’ Newcastle’s men had apparently 
‘left much of their powder, match, and arms behind them’ and those who were slow 
to retreat were killed by the Scots including ‘some men of note’.74 
 Interestingly, when this battle began the Scots had no time to muster their 
heavier cannon from Sunderland, but ‘by the help of the Sea-men lying in the haven, 
we conveyed one great piece over the water, who themselves drew it up to the field 
where it was to be planted.’ It was this loyalty from the seamen of Sunderland that 
enabled the battle cannonade to last from 4pm to midnight. This reinforced the 
special relationship that existed between the borough’s citizens and the Scots.75 
 Royalist accounts of the battle tell of their four foot regiments fighting six 
‘regiments of the rebels’ from three o’clock until night. They accused the Scots of 
vanishing ‘into their trenches and retirements in Sunderland’ and not coming out 
again until Sir Charles Lucas’s cavalry ‘forced all their horse (which is about 3000) to 
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hasten up the hill to their cannon, all the way doing sharp execution upon them, so 
as their Lancers lay plentifully upon the ground.’ The Scots’ cannon fire undoubtedly 
killed many Royalists during this encounter, but they only admitted to losing 240 
‘common soldiers’, whilst wrongly asserting that 1000 Scots had been killed or taken 
prisoner. Newcastle’s men were also said to have ‘taken very many of their arms, 
especially of their Scottish pistols’. Instead of admitting to their retreat the Royalists 
merely mentioned that the exhausted Scots ‘would by no means be entreated to 
show themselves’.76 Another Royalist account erroneously declared that the battle 
was their victory as the Scots lancers had been routed by Lucas whilst the rest of the 
army fled.77   
 Though the first day’s fighting was inconclusive, overall victory was modestly 
claimed by the Scots army.78 News quickly spread amongst Parliamentarian forces 
fighting elsewhere of ‘a great battle fought betwixt the Scots and the earl of 
Newcastle’s forces which continued two days, but the Lord pleased to give victory to 
the Scots.’79 It is unfortunate that the Scot’s tendency to play down this battle 
accounts for its subsequent marginalization in histories of the British Civil Wars. Even 
in 1646 it was being dismissed as an engagement of no consequence by Edward 
Bowles, who also claimed that there were few casualties. This hardly tallies with 
Scottish army accounts that demonstrate a substantial use of gunpowder and 
musketballs on 24-25 March. Furgol has observed that at the Offerton skirmish and 
the battle at Hylton ‘Leven stood on the defensive against Newcastle, because the 
cautious approach was safest for an army deep in enemy territory and far from a 
friendly army or garrison.’80 This ignores the importance of having Sunderland as a 
nearby friendly supply port and garrison. Terry shrewdly noted that ‘the Marquis's 
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despatch … claimed at least an honourable retreat’, whilst Firth states that 
Newcastle was conscious of his ‘unsuccessful attempt to bring on a battle’.81 On 25 
March, Newcastle wrote somewhat remorsefully to congratulate Prince Rupert on 
his successful relief of Newark whilst asking for his assistance against the Scots. 
I must assure your Highness, that the Scots are as big again in foot as I am, 
and their horse, I doubt, much better than ours are, so that if your Highness 
do not please to come hither, and that very soon too, the great game of your 
uncle's will be endangered, if not lost. 82 
 
 Only William Lithgow dared to call it with hindsight, in 1645, ‘that laudable victory’.83 
 The Scots admitted to having ‘300 wounded, some of them slain, and others 
since dead to the number of 60’, but alleged that 1500 of Newcastle’s men were 
killed. Another account alleged that 4000 were ‘slain’ and that ‘16 pieces of 
Ordnance, and many of the enemies prisoners besides all their ammunition, bigge 
[foodstuffs] and baggage’ were taken by the Scots. The fallen were apparently given 
‘an honourable burial according to their degrees' by General Leslie and 100 prisoners 
were taken back to Sunderland. As there is no record of these burials in the register 
of Bishopwearmouth church, the dead were presumably buried near the battlefield 
or taken to Monkwearmouth for burial.84 On 26 March the main Scots army crossed 
the Wear ‘by a bridge of keels at Sunderland, and the horse by a ford at Hylton 
House’ and then quartered at Farringdon Hall.85  This use of keel boats as pontoons is 
rare, though specific bridge boats were used by the Earl of Essex’s army at 
Gloucester.86 
Supplying the army: forage and plunder 
With the main military actions seemingly over, the garrisons left at Sunderland still 
needed foodstuffs. Foraging parties from both sides were, however, unpopular with 
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the folk who lived in County Durham.87 The Scots commissioners forbade 
‘plundering, pillaging and burning of houses’ by their troops on 16 March 1644 and 
admitted remorse for burning what could not be removed including ‘keels and their 
furniture to the great discredit of this cause’.88 On 26 March the committee with the 
Scots army complained to London that they needed cash, for County Durham was 
now a country where there is nothing left to be sequestrated, and which … is 
altogether unable to supply the inhabitants, being so wasted and spoiled by 
the forces which have been lying and lived upon it, unless some relief come 
from other places unto it, we fear within a short time it shall be deserted by 
the inhabitants, who for the most part are old men, women and children.89 
 
The Scots and Royalists were thus equally to blame for this situation.  As soon 
as they reached Sunderland the Scots had taken ‘what care we could for supply of 
provisions in this Enemies' country, for so we find it, not receiving any intelligence or 
willing supply from them’.90 Another account reiterated that the farmers of County 
Durham were either ‘willingly or forcedly in arms against the Parliament, and afford 
us no manner of supply, but what they part with against their wills’.91 A despatch to 
Basil Fielding, Earl of Denbigh, blamed their Royalist support on the ‘great power’ 
that ‘the cathedral’ had in the county.92 The Venetian ambassador even noted that 
the Scots ‘find themselves shut in near Sunderland in a country naturally sterile and 
devastated by the inhabitants to their injury’.93  
The Parliamentarian and Scots armies therefore had to resort to plundering 
for food supplies, but they did not stop there. In the autumn of 1644 Sarah Paull, 
widow of the Royalist William Freeman of Sunderland, ‘craveth allowance … for the 
[household] goods plundered and taken away from her by the armies, part under the 
command of Sir William Armine and part by the Scottish army in and about the 
month of September 1644 … to the sum of £37 4s 2d.’ She also claimed £100 ‘taken 
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away after by Armine as forfeited to the state’ and £16 for a quarter share of a ship 
‘which was immediately after the death of the deceased cast away and never came 
to the hands and possession of this administrix’.94 William Freeman had the 
misfortune to be one of the few Royalists left in Sunderland when the Scots had 
arrived in March. None the less this paucity of local supplies reinforced the armies’ 
desperate need to import supplies from elsewhere through the port at Sunderland. 
‘A place of so great consequence to us’ 
Although Newcastle upon Tyne has often been the focus of historians studying the 
Civil Wars in the North East, it would be Sunderland that proved to be the key access 
point for supplying victuals to the over-stretched Scottish army and coals to London 
during the spring and summer of 1644. The Scots themselves referred to Sunderland 
as ‘a place of so great consequence to us’, but by 11 March they had ominously 
taken possession of ‘coals at Lambton and Lumley worth twenty thousand pounds’.95  
The Parliamentarian commissioners who came to the town were boastful about 
possessing so much coal, but really wanted the ships coming to the port for coal to 
‘bring some provisions for the army, especially six-shillings beer, hay or oats’. The 
Scots army was critically short of supplies as ‘five Barques sent from Scotland to us, 
with provisions are lost, three of them perished, and two were driven into Tyne by 
extremity of weather, and seized on by the enemy.’96 With little to forage the 
soldiers were near to starvation ‘having neither meat or drink’ nor ‘above twenty 
and four hours of provisions’. On 22 March Parliament specifically sent butter and 
corn ‘to our Brethren in Sunderland’ who were ‘in danger of perishing for lack of 
victuals’.97 One shipload of corn that had been seized at Yarmouth in January was 
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specifically redirected ‘to Sunderland for the Scottish army’. Ships also came from 
Scotland as the Blessing of Kirkcaldy came into Sunderland with victuals.98 
Supply ships and colliers heading to and from Sunderland were an obvious 
target for Royalists working out of Scarborough as ‘Captain Browne Bushell took and 
brought into Scarborough 6 ships, 4 from Scotland, and 2 from Hull, all laden with 
arms, ammunition, and provision for these Brethren, with 4 field pieces, and 12 
mortar pieces.’99 Sir Hugh Cholmley and his Scarborough-based privateers 
'succeeded in capturing a total of forty Sunderland vessels, on their passage to 
London with coals'.100 Parliament responded by announcing that in ‘March 1644, the 
Endeavour and three other of the king's ships were captured off Sunderland’, but 
this did not really compensate for the losses near Scarborough. Retaliation 
continued for in July ‘a ship, loaded with ammunition, small arms and twenty-two 
pieces of ordnance for Newcastle, was captured and brought into our port 
[Sunderland]'.101 The experience of William Trotter, who was paid £30 compensation 
in April 1644, is typical. He ‘was taken prisoner to Sunderland, his malt sold, and £30 
of the proceeds detained by order of Sir William Armine.’102  
Sunderland would remain an essential supply base for both the 
Parliamentarian and Scottish armies in the North for several months. Their 
commanders sent requests ‘to Sunderland for provisions’ on 1, 6 and 14 April 1644. 
Indeed the army ‘had no other means of subsistence hithertill but from Sunderland’. 
Arms were also supplied as ‘500 of the 2000 muskets with their bandoleers … now 
lying at Sunderland’ on 6 April were sent onwards to Scottish regiments fighting 
elsewhere.103 
A renewed focus on coal 
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Important as victuals were to the Scots, they also wanted control of Wearside’s coal 
mines. In late March 1644 retreating Royalists had been ‘chased to Chester-le-Street, 
Durham, Bishop Auckland and Brancepeth’, with the Scots ‘clearing the way up the 
River as they went’. The Scots had kept pursuing the Royalist army along the Wear 
towards Lumley Castle specifically ‘to clear the River for coals’.104 Parliament was 
annoyed that Royalists from Newcastle had ‘entered the district of Sunderland 
where they chastised those who were getting coal to send here [London] and burned 
the mines, so that London may feel the miss of it which will be unbearable next 
winter, as they have felled most of the trees in the neighbourhood’.105  They had also 
‘hindered the lighters from carrying the coals to the ships’, so the Sunderland 
seamen asked for a convoy system to circumvent this, but this was temporarily 
disrupted by the battle of Hylton.  Apparently there were ‘about 120 ships that ride 
in Sunderland Harbour for coals, and there is so great a quantity of coals already 
above the ground at the pits ready to be taken away, that they are not to be valued: 
there is so vast a quantity’.106 
In March 1644 no duties were payable on domestic coal shipments. Previous 
levies had been difficult to collect as prominent Sunderland coal merchants had 
refused to pay them.107 However, a levy on coal and salt was being discussed as 
Parliamentarian and Scottish army salaries had to be paid. It was estimated that 
there were annually ‘4,000 tens or 40,000 chaldrons [of coal] at Sunderland’. The 
Sunderland salt pans belonging to Sir William Lambton normally ‘burnt 300 tons of 
coal, but are at present out of repair’. 300 tons were sent ‘for the use of the alum 
works [near Whitby]’. Sir Lionel Maddison, a prominent Newcastle merchant, 
questioned whether an impost should be levied on salt and coal for ‘both being so 
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necessary commodities, and though of low and mean value, yet so useful for all, 
even the meanest people ...’ However, he did not think a new levy would affect 
trade from Sunderland as they were annoyingly prospering whilst the blockade on 
trade to and from Newcastle continued.108 Sunderland’s coal owners would have 
disagreed with Maddison, but on 15 July Parliament resolved ‘that four shillings a 
chaldron, Sunderland measure, being after the rate of two shillings a chaldron, 
London measure, or thereabouts, shall be laid upon all coals to be shipped and 
transported from port to port. This imposition to continue for six months’. They also 
ordered that ‘no coal, Sunderland measure, shall be sold there at above fourteen 
shillings the chaldron, the best, and twelve Shillings the chaldron the worst, to be 
delivered at the ship side’ for six months. Also ‘no coal shall be transported beyond 
seas, without the leave of the houses of Parliament, upon pain of forfeiture of ship 
and coals’.109  
 This attempt to regulate Sunderland’s coal duties, destinations and prices 
brought home the economic reality of this borough’s support for the Scottish and 
Parliamentarian armies. There would be no free-for-all on coal prices which 
appeared to play into the hands of the blockaded merchants of Newcastle whose 
‘economic position was founded entirely on the monopolistic stranglehold they had 
over the Northern coal trade’. However, they could still not trade and it looked as 
though ‘Parliament was seemingly making every effort to establish Sunderland as a 
rival to Newcastle.’ 110 This included suggestions that extra workers should be sent to 
Sunderland ‘to dig coal, and work in the coal pits’. Indeed from May until ‘July the 
House of Commons appears to have devoted a considerable time to the question of 
the Sunderland [Wearside] collieries’.111 The Committee for the Navy was also 
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involved with these arrangements as new coal workers were to be sent from the 
south of England.112  
In July 1644 leases of the most productive mines near Sunderland at Lumley 
and Lambton were avidly sought from Parliament by Sir William Langley, George 
Lilburne and George Grey as they belonged to ‘delinquents’ (Royalists and Catholics). 
They were granted to them on 15 July and Newcastle feared that Sunderland would 
finally break their cherished monopoly over coal. Langley, Lilburne and Grey were 
also restored to their existing collieries that had previously been forfeited to the 
Crown and they were given compensation for coals taken by the enemy.113 
Competition for lucrative Wearside mines continued as the wars went in favour of 
Parliament and more ‘delinquents’ were identified. George Lilburne was even 
accused of harassing Lady Lambton, who had gone to London complaining of his 
‘hard and unjust usage’ of her interests.114 As Lilburne, Langley and Grey were so 
richly rewarded for their loyalty any opposition they bore towards Parliamentary 
control of the coal trade would have been somewhat placated. 
Sunderland and the Scottish military occupation, 1644-46 
Sunderland remained an important town to the Scots and Parliamentarian armies 
during the spring and summer of 1644. Commissioners for the army, commissioners 
for Parliament and the committee with the Scottish army had all gathered at 
Sunderland by 1 April. They noted that in contrast to early March Sunderland was 
now ‘a place where is great store of provision’ and that the Scots ‘hath fortified the 
Town very well, and secured all places’.115 Although the bulk of the Scots army 
moved south in early April 1644 General Leslie had acknowledged Sunderland’s 
importance by leaving behind two regiments amounting to a much larger 3,000-
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strong garrison with another regiment nearby. 100 prisoners of rank were still held 
in the town as well, but the ordinary foot soldiers were released.116  
The Scots were actively recruiting more men and arms from Scotland. On 13 
April 1644 John Colville wrote from Sunderland to David Melville at Raith, near 
Kirkcaldy in Fife. He granted Melville a receipt for twelve men and their arms, levy 
and transport money.117 The Sunderland garrisons were also replenished with barrels 
of gunpowder from London, but there was concern that Leslie’s army was solely 
reliant upon Sunderland for supplies after it had marched south. The committee of 
the army noted on 21 April (from Tadcaster) that they had ‘no other meanes of 
subsistence hithertills bot from Sunderland’.118 Parliament therefore continued to 
make supplying the ‘Brethren of Scotland’ a priority, just as long as the supply ships 
returned south with coal.119  
The Royalists certainly acknowledged their enemies’ reliance upon 
Sunderland for when they quit Lumley Castle, they took some ‘forty of our colliers 
and keelmen’ prisoner. This was probably the incident reported by Robert Douglas 
on 11 April whilst he ‘loadeth his party with butter, cheeses, bread, and oats. A party 
of our musketeer of toward 100 sent from Sunderland to guard the keels near 
Lumley, surprised by the enemy, and taken.’ Nevertheless when Leslie’s forces came 
within ‘a mile and half of Durham’ on 12 April, Royalist forces quickly moved out of 
Durham and headed for Yorkshire.120 
There was some turnover within the garrisons left at Sunderland on 5 May 
1644 when Colonel William Stewart of the Galloway Foot regiment was made 
governor of Sunderland. On the same day the committee of the army ordered the 
Earl of Lothian’s Teviotdale Foot regiment ‘to Sunderland, with a horse troop’.121 
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Provisions for the army at Sunderland were continually replenished from Scotland, 
England and local merchants. Common soldiers received their much needed pay in 
cash and future army loans were guaranteed against the ‘coals to be furnished’ from 
Sunderland.122  
The soldiers still had to be on their guard for in late May 1644 the Royalist 
James Graham, Marquis of Montrose, retook South Shields Fort which Leven had 
initially taken on 20 March.123  The Sunderland garrison later retook the fort, but had 
to contend with ‘the energy of Montrose’ who was wreaking havoc in North East 
England and determined to retake Sunderland. Indeed ‘towards the end of May 
[1644], the town was only saved by the energy of the seamen, who placed 
themselves under arms, planted cannon on the walls, and with the help of Colonel 
Charles Fairfax, repulsed Montrose, Musgrave and others engaged in the attempt’.124 
The seamen’s defiant stance earned them a £200 reward from Parliament, though it 
was not paid until October 1644. The Scots had supplied the seamen with 
ammunition ‘upon compulsion’ on 22 May.125 A further 500 muskets were bought at 
Sunderland on 26 May to help arm the town and Colonel Allen received more 
powder, musket balls and match ‘for the use of the seamen under my command’, as 
did others who commanded the seamen.126 The seamen also thwarted attempts by 
Royalists who tried to burn and spoil ‘stairs and coals and endeavoured to stop the 
passage for boats by a dam across the river, which the seamen quickly pulled’.127  
General Leslie was prevented from coming to Sunderland’s aid as he was 
besieging York at this time. The willing co-operation of the ‘gunners, townsmen & 
seamen’ of Sunderland on the side of the Scottish army is therefore considerable 
and why, as civilians, they were supplied with so many army weapons and 
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ammunition. However, the Scottish commanders were probably annoyed to record 
an unfortunate incident when ‘1 field piece’ was ‘broken at Sunderland by a sea 
gunner’.128  
 Any remaining Royalists in Sunderland were severely dealt with by Sir William 
Armine, as Parliamentarian commissioner. He even apprehended the once loyal ‘Mr 
Grey and his fitter [keel crewman], for opposing Parliament and Committee of both 
kingdoms’. On 20 June Armine assured Sir Henry Vane, the Lord Lieutenant of 
Durham, that having taken care of Royalist attacks and obstructions ‘we hope to find 
quicker despatch in lading the ships than hitherto’.129  
Sunderland remained a favoured location of Parliament, even after the Tyne 
opened up for trade again on 14 November 1644.130 Sunderland would continue as a 
supply base for both the Scots and Parliamentarian armies until 1646. For example 
during the autumn of 1645 arms were still being shipped through Sunderland by the 
Vanes and Lilburnes. Other goods were still coming through the port for the Scottish 
army such as ‘cloth, linen …’ worth £7,661. 15s. 7d. There was still a Scottish army 
presence in Sunderland during 1645-6 for in January 1646 the Earl of Lothian’s 
regiment was stationed there.131 
 Many northerners feared the Scots, but not so the people of Sunderland. The 
Scottish soldiers stationed at the Sunderland garrison freely mingled with townsfolk 
during 1644-46. The ministers who accompanied the Scottish troops tolerated their 
heavy drinking, but would not have allowed them to abuse of local women. On the 
contrary, there were a number of marriages at Bishopwearmouth church between 
local women and Scottish soldiers. On 18 June 1644 William Sommerville married 
Margaret Moody of Wearmouth, followed on 27 August when Adam Thompson wed 
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Ursula Bee of Sunderland. This pattern continued for on 20 January 1646 Robert Hay 
married Mary Horsley of Bishopwearmouth. The births of children to Scottish 
garrison families are recorded for on 16 August 1644 ‘Michael, son of Matthew 
Marshall, soldier of the garrison’ was baptised. Five other children of Scotsmen were 
baptised during 1644-46; George Stephen, Thomas Watson, James Turnbull and 
finally on 11 November 1646 ‘Isabel Alexander the daughter of John Alexander of 
the Scotch Army.’ Their mothers were presumably camp followers of their husbands’ 
regiments, though Thomas Harvey, ‘son of Wilkin a Scottish man’ was presumably 
illegitimate as he did not have his father’s surname.132 
‘Secure the Toun of Newcastle’ 
The friendliness of the Scottish occupation of Sunderland contrasted sharply with 
their attitude towards the occupants of Newcastle upon Tyne. They were still holding 
out against the Scots and Parliament during the summer of 1644. Indeed the need 
for more Scottish forces in the North East had been agreed by the Committee of 
Both Kingdoms on 20 June 1644. Two days earlier David Leslie, Lord Callendar, 
received instructions from the Scottish Parliament in Edinburgh to 
reduce and secure the Toun of Newcastle, castle of Tynemouth, and all other 
places possessed by the enemy … And make such use of the forces of the 
Bishopric as may conduce most for these ends, But with a special regard for 
the safety of the Toun of Sunderland.133  
 
The planned attack on Newcastle by Callendar did not take place as his forces were 
diverted to the battle at Marston Moor on 2 July 1644, followed by the surrender of 
York on 16 July. It was not until 12 August that the army advanced to Gateshead, 
while Leven paid visits of inspection to Sunderland and Hartlepool.134 Callendar’s 
army was instructed to consider sheltering at Sunderland or Hartlepool at this time 
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for Royalist forces were riding north to oppose him at Gateshead. Parliamentarian 
commissioners were still stationed at Sunderland and although the Marquis of 
Newcastle had fled to Hamburg, the forces of the Marquis of Montrose and Sir 
Robert Clavering were still feared in the North.135 
On 23 August 1644 the Committee of Both Kingdoms met at Sunderland to 
order provisions for the Scots army in the North and they were still there on 30 
September as storming Royalist Newcastle was now their priority.136 In August 
weapons were being sent from the Sunderland magazine to assist ‘Lord Sinclair’s 
battery against Newcastle upon Tyne’. These arms were replenished with ‘10,000 lb 
powder, 10,000 lb lead and 20,000 match’ from London.137 Knowing that Newcastle 
was fully under siege the committee of the navy also ordered that ‘the ships which 
are to carry the money and provisions to Sunderland be hastened away with all 
speed’ on 9 September. A further 200 barrels of gunpowder were despatched to 
Sunderland on 15 September. On 24 September 1644 the Committee for 
Compounding ordered Robert Carr and his Samuel Justina, to Sunderland with yet 
more supplies ‘for the army at Sunderland’. Another pass was granted to ‘Thomas 
Bedell, of the Hector, carrying £15,000 to the Scots army near Sunderland’, which 
arrived on 4 October.138  
Lord Sinclair and his soldiers had been attacking the Sandgate in Newcastle, 
from across the River Tyne, but the city was not stormed until 19 October 1644. A 
popular rhyme noted the short-lived bravado that preceded this and Newcastle’s 
poor opinion of Sunderland’s alliance with the Scottish army: 
Ride through the Sandgate both up and down, 
There you'll see the gallants fighting for the crown. 
All the cull cuckolds in Sunderland Town, 
32 
 
With all the bonny blue caps cannot pull them down.139 
 
The Royalist Newcastle garrison had fully surrendered to the Scots by 22 
October and Sir William Armine was quick to move there from Sunderland. On 27 
October he was asking Parliament to consider ‘what advantage the [Newcastle] coal 
trade and customs are for the maintenance of their armies’. Parliament wanted to 
‘employ all the moneys thereupon arising for the use of the army’, but they were 
warned to ‘take diligent care that no such course be taken with the coal here as has 
been done at Sunderland’.140  This referred to complaints that a corrupt Sunderland 
custom house was not providing enough money for the army. 
Sunderland’s custom duties and payments to the Scots army 
Hew Kennedy had been appointed collector of customs in 1644 to keep ‘account of 
all entries, cocquets, and payments there [Sunderland]’, but he had gone into 
Yorkshire with the army. The commissioners remaining at Sunderland ‘had the sole 
managing of the excise, customs, and price of the coals in their hands, which 
apparently they find then so sweet that they have never since been willing that any 
of us should be conscious unto or have any knowledge of their affairs’.141 James 
Sword was therefore appointed by the Scottish commissioners to ‘sit in the 
customhouse and excise office in the town of Newcastle and Sunderland’ on 18 
November 1644. He was to receive all payments and ‘keep a key of the chest where 
the moneys lieth’.142 Despite these local difficulties the Scottish army had regularly 
received their pay from Sunderland during 1644. However, their money was mostly 
shipped in from elsewhere owing to the problems of collecting customs duties at 
Sunderland. 
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The pressing need to pay the army continued into 1645. Between 6 October 
and 1 November 1645 payments to the Scots army amounted to ‘£53,000 in respect 
of the sale of coals at Newcastle and Sunderland’. Payments for £200,000, plus 
£21,000 per month was being demanded by the army by December 1645.143 On 3 
October 1646 Sir Adam Hepburn of Humbie, Collector-General and Treasurer of the 
Scots army, received a further £400 ‘forth of the custom house of Sunderland’.144 
Parliament had clearly struggled to pay the Scots army all the money it was 
promised. Perhaps this is why Sir William Armine, who had long supported the 
intervention of this army, finally turned against their occupation of North East 
England.145 More efficient levying of coal duties and payments sanctioned by the 
House of Commons ensured that the Scots left England by 11 February 1647 with all 
their pay, which was very unusual for an early modern army. Laura Stewart 
estimates that, after much bargaining, the Scots were paid a total of £816,089 for 
their 1643-47 campaigns in England.146 Sunderland had, arguably, contributed far 
more than money to the Scottish campaign with free access to its port facilities and 
the support of their seamen during the British Civil Wars. Sunderland had therefore 
played a significant part in the first British Civil Wars. 
War could be disastrous for urban communities caught up in campaigns, yet 
the port of Sunderland benefited economically from the British Civil Wars. 
Sunderland had taken advantage of the blockade of Newcastle to increase their 
share of the coal trade in 1644, even though the Wear was not as navigable as the 
Tyne.  The borough’s civic leaders, such as George Lilburne, made a considerable 
fortune out of local coal mine leases. Unlike the merchants of Newcastle, 
Sunderland’s leaders do not appear to have regretted the Scottish occupation or its 
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costs.147 The seamen of Sunderland also prospered as increasing trade in and out of 
Sunderland gave them more employment than before the wars began. The 
borough’s continuing prosperity would, in turn, attract more people to settle and 
invest in Sunderland. So Sunderland’s defiance of ‘Mitre, Scepter, and the Crown’148 
in the 1640s was as profitable as it was political. 
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*This article is based upon research for the Durham Victoria County History Trust’s History of 
Sunderland, part of the Heritage Lottery Fund and Victoria County History’s England’s Past for Everyone 
project. I am grateful to Professor Richard Hoyle, formerly Director and General Editor of the Victoria 
County History, for permission to reproduce the map for this article. This was first published in M. M. 
Meikle and C. M. Newman, Sunderland and its Origins. Monks to Mariners (Chichester, 2007), p. 125. 
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